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The psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm is a dominant research tool in the
literature on dual-task performance. In this paradigm a first and second component
task (i.e., Task 1 and Task 2) are presented with variable stimulus onset asynchronies
(SOAs) and priority to perform Task 1. The main indicator of dual-task impairment in
PRP situations is an increasing Task 2-RT with decreasing SOAs. This impairment is
typically explained with some task components being processed strictly sequentially in
the context of the prominent central bottleneck theory. This assumption could implicitly
suggest that processes of Task 1 are unaffected by Task 2 and bottleneck processing,
i.e., decreasing SOAs do not increase reaction times (RTs) and error rates of the
first task. The aim of the present review is to assess whether PRP dual-task studies
included both RT and error data presentations and statistical analyses and whether
studies including both data types (i.e., RTs and error rates) show data consistent with
this assumption (i.e., decreasing SOAs and unaffected RTs and/or error rates in Task
1). This review demonstrates that, in contrast to RT presentations and analyses, error
data is underrepresented in a substantial number of studies. Furthermore, a substantial
number of studies with RT and error data showed a statistically significant impairment
of Task 1 performance with decreasing SOA. Thus, these studies produced data that
is not primarily consistent with the strong assumption that processes of Task 1 are
unaffected by Task 2 and bottleneck processing in the context of PRP dual-task
situations; this calls for a more careful report and analysis of Task 1 performance in
PRP studies and for a more careful consideration of theories proposing additions to
the bottleneck assumption, which are sufficiently general to explain Task 1 and Task 2
effects.
Keywords: PRP, dual tasks, capacity limitation, central bottleneck theory, reaction times, error data
Introduction
When people execute two simultaneous or systematically delayed distinct tasks under dual-task
conditions, performance in these tasks is often impaired (e.g., Kahneman, 1973; Wickens, 1980;
Pashler, 2000, and many more). In the context of well-controllable behavioral dual-task situations,
these impairments are demonstrated by an increase in reaction times (RTs) and/or error rates under
dual-task in contrast to single-task conditions (the isolated task execution), referred to as “dual-task
costs.”
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One of the most prominent dual-task situations is of the psy-
chological refractory period (PRP) type (Telford, 1931; Vince,
1949; Welford, 1952; Pashler, 1984, 1994; Pashler and Johnston,
1989, 1998; Osman and Moore, 1993; Schubert, 1999; Schubert
et al., 2008). In this dual-task situation, two component tasks are
presented in close succession with various time intervals between
the onsets of a first and second task stimulus (i.e., variable stim-
ulus onset asynchronies, SOAs) and participants are given fixed-
priority instructions on the execution of the first task (Task 1). As
illustrated in Figure 1A, the performance of the second task (Task
2) typically decreases (e.g., RTs increase) with decreasing SOA
and increasing task overlap. This performance decrease indicates
dual-task costs in the context of PRP dual tasks (i.e., the PRP
effect).
To explain the PRP effect, the prominent central bottleneck
theory suggests that the mental operation associated with the
selection of which response to execute can never be made for two
tasks simultaneously. Instead, this model assumes that response
selection requires a single mechanism to be dedicated to it for
some period of time. Thus, there is a strict sequential response
selection in two tasks of a dual-task situation due to a structural
and unavoidable processing bottleneck. In this strict interpre-
tation of the central bottleneck model, the sequential process-
ing at the central bottleneck leads to processing impairments
(i.e., processing delays or errors) in the second component tasks
of a PRP situation. This processing impairment increases with
decreasing SOA (Pashler, 1994), leading to the PRP effect in
Task 2.
Accordingly, the literature on PRP/central bottleneck theory
typically introduces and entails no effect of SOA on Task 1
performance (Figure 1A; e.g., Pashler, 1984, 1994; Allen et al.,
1998; Ruthruff and Pashler, 2001; Kunde et al., 2007, and many
more). This lacking effect is a consequence of the assumption of
a strict sequential processing of response selections, i.e., (1) an
engagement of a central processing mechanism of 100 and 0%
to Task 1 and Task 2, respectively, before (2) an engagement of
this mechanism of 0 and 100% to Task 1 and Task 2, respectively.
Task 1 and Task 2 performance analyses should thus be treated in
the context of PRP situations and the central bottleneck theory
in order to test these assumptions. Furthermore, these analyses
should focus on all available data types. In the context of most
behavioral experiments, these analyses combine analyses on RTs
as well as error rate data.1
The dual-task literature, however, seems to treat (1) Task 1
performance and (2) error rates with less emphasis and caution.
One of the few examples that systematically relates dual-task per-
formance in form of error rates to RTs occurs in a series of studies
combining ideomotor compatibility tasks (i.e., component tasks
1Here, erroneous dual-task performance is defined as giving an incorrect
response or omitting a response in a particular component task and with
separate error rate analyses on Task 1 and Task 2. This perspective does not
consider studies in which any error that occurred during dual-task perfor-
mance (irrespective of the component task)meant that the dual task as a whole
was not performed correctly and thus error analysis was conducted for both
tasks in combination (e.g., Logan and Schulkind, 2000; Strobach et al., 2013;
Zwosta et al., 2013). We take this perspective, because the combined error
analysis does not allow elaborated and independent conclusions for Task 1 and
Task 2 performance.
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of performance patterns in the context of dual
tasks of the Psychological Refractory Period type (note, that an
increase at the y axis represents performance impairment and an
increase at the x axis represents an increase in stimulus onset
asynchrony, SOA). Panel (A): Task 1 and Task 2 performance according to
the central bottleneck model. Panel (B): Task 1 and Task 2 performance
according to less strict sequential interpretations of bottleneck models and
impaired performance with decreasing SOA in both tasks.
in which stimulus information shares response information; e.g.,
if an auditory stimulus is “A” or “B,” say “A” and “B,” respectively)
in PRP situations (Lien et al., 2002; Greenwald, 2003). Dual-task
performance showed an effect of SOA on error rates regardless of
the type of instruction (Shin et al., 2007). These rates increased
from long to short SOAs under conditions of a speed-instruction
(i.e., “Perform as fast as possible”) as well as under a speed-and-
accuracy instruction (i.e., “Perform as fast and as accurately as
possible”) in both Task 1 and Task 2. The authors interpreted
these findings (in combination with RT data) as evidence for
bottleneck processing when combining ideomotor compatible
tasks. Alongside this example, there are only very few approaches
in PRP literature and literature with strict interpretations of the
central bottleneck theory that systematically apply and interpret
error data with a focus on Task 1 performance for modeling dual-
task processing. This is surprising considering that alternative
theoretical approaches within the context of the central bottleneck
theory (see Discussion) and outside this context (e.g., resource
theories, Kantowitz, 1978; Logan and Gordon, 2001; Navon and
Miller, 2002; Wickens, 2002; Tombu and Jolicœur, 2003) partic-
ularly provide systematic interpretations of Task 1’s error rates
as well as RTs. The consideration of Task 1’s data is essential to
produce a comprehensive picture of dual-task processing in the
context of these theories.
As a consequence of the impression of treating Task 1 perfor-
mance with less emphasis and caution, the aim of the present
study is to systematically review PRP literature with a focus on
(1) the report policy of Task 1 performance data as well as (2) the
actual performance in this task. The first aim generally specifies
the policy to report error data compared to RT data of Task 1.
Importantly, we specify this policy with a focus on presenting
RT and error data (e.g., in form of figures and/or tables), as
well as reporting statistics on both performance measures (e.g.,
in form of analysis of variance). While the central bottleneck
theory makes explicit assumptions on RTs, error rates are often
underrepresented in the context of this theory. Therefore, we
speculate that, due to this underrepresentation, the number of
PRP studies including reported error data (i.e., in form of data
presentations and statistical analyses) is lower than the number
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including RT data (despite a general request of no selective data
report in empirical studies, Boot et al., 2011).
We review whether Task 1 performance is independent of SOA
using the perspective of the second aim: that is, RTs and error rates
are constant across SOAs. On the other hand, the following data
patterns in Task 1 are not conceivable in the context of this theory:
(1) RTs are constant and error rates increase with decreasing SOA,
(2) error rates are constant and RTs increase with decreasing SOA,
(3) error rates and RTs increase with decreasing SOA (Figure 1B).
These latter data patterns are consistent with the assumption that
bottleneck processing is potentially less sequential than theorized
in a strict interpretation of the central bottleneck theory, but
they call for additions to this assumption (as indicated in the
Discussion).
We aim to investigate the proportion of PRP studies that are
consistent with one of these data patterns in the present review.
In detail, we analyzed the number of PRP experiments showing a
statistically significant main effect of SOA (typically in ANOVAs)
on Task 1’s RTs and/or error rates, in combination with data
patterns demonstrating impaired performance with decreasing
SOA (i.e., increased RTs and/or error rates with shorter SOA).2
PRP dual-task situations are rigorous tests of these patterns in
Task 1, since participants are explicitly instructed to prioritize
this task. This priority on Task 1 should make this task less
vulnerable for performance modulations due to the timing (i.e.,
SOA) of the following Task 2 and should reduce the likelihood
of impaired Task 1 performance with decreasing SOAs. Note
that we exclusively review SOA main effects on RTs and/or error
rates because we focus on robust effects. This focus on robust
effects parallels the robust emergence of PRP effects in Task 2
and their clear demonstration via SOAmain effects. Furthermore,
our focus on SOA main effects allows us to combine analyses
across different studies in which SOA modulation is often com-
bined with one or a set of alternative factors (e.g., modulations of
stimulus characteristics, stimulus-response relations, etc.). Gen-
erally, this type of review should help advance the dual-task
literature by specifying the dual-task processing architecture of
PRP dual tasks. Furthermore, this review investigates the ben-
efits of using error rates and/or Task 1 performance as a data
source to improve our insight into dual-task processing and its
theory.
Methods
We searched papers via the abstracting and indexing database
PsycINFO devoted to peer-reviewed literature in the behav-
ioral sciences and mental health on May 17th 2013. The search
term was “PRP.” This search resulted in a total number of 291
entries from which we excluded reviews, clinical papers, disserta-
tion abstracts, book chapters, modeling studies, and non-English
entries. This exclusion procedure left a selection of 133 studies. In
total, these studies comprised 306 experiments.
2We were not interested in the reverse phenomenon of impaired performance
with increasing SOA (i.e., decreased RTs/error rates at short in contrast to
long SOAs) which is typically discussed in the context of grouping of two
responses/a tendency to withhold the execution of a first response until the
execution of a second response (Borger, 1963; Miller and Ulrich, 2008).
Results
In the Results section, we first focus on the amount of papers
presenting Task 1’s RT data vs. error rates in form of figures and/or
tables. Secondly, we report the amount of studies that perform
inference-statistical analyses (e.g., analysis of variance) on RTs
and/or error rates of this task. Thirdly, we review PRP studies with
a particular focus on the impact of decreasing SOA on decreasing
performance (i.e., increasing RTs and error rates) in Task 1.
The number and percent of experiments (out of the total of
306 experiments of 133 studies) presenting RT or error data in
form of (1) figures, (2) tables, (3) figures and tables, as well as
(4) figures and/or tables for Task 1, is presented in Table 1. Apart
from what PRP studies include and is presented in this table, the
reversed perspective on this table is remarkable: 181 (59.2%) of all
experiments [and 97 (45.3%) of all experiments with presentation
of Task 1 RT data] presented no error data. In contrast, only 92
(30.1%) of all experiments [and 8 (6.4%) of all experiments with
presentation of error data] presented noRTdata. Thus, this review
demonstrates the underrepresentation of error data presentation
in contrast to presenting RTs of Task 1 in PRP dual-task studies.
The number and percent of experiments (out of a total of 306
experiments of 133 studies) with statistical analyses of RT or error
data is presented in Table 2. From our perspective, the most
crucial fact of this table is that only 48.7% of the experiments pro-
vided statistical analyses of their RTs and error rates. On the other
side, this table shows that there is no complete presentation of
statistical analyses for 51.3% of the experiments. Thus, this review
demonstrates thatmanyPRPdual-task studies allowno conclusive
conclusions about Task 1 performance and no test of the implicit
assumption that this task’s performance is independent of SOA.
While focusing on the third issue, we exclusively analyzed the
selection of studies (combining 149 experiments, see Appendix)
that provided statistical analyses of their Task 1’s RTs and error
rates (Table 3). This focus shows that a remarkable number of PRP
dual-task studies produced data that are not consistent with the
assumption of a strict sequential bottleneck processing but calls
for additions to this bottleneck assumption (Figure 1B): Task 1
performance was not independent of SOA inmost of these studies
and showed impaired performance with decreasing SOA (67.1%).
TABLE 1 | Number and percent of experiments presenting RTs and error
rates in figures, tables, figures and tables, as well as figures or tables.
Figures Tables Figures
and tables
Figures
or tables
RTs 177 (57.8%) 72 (23.5%) 38 (12.4%) 214 (69.9%)
Error rates 19 (6.2%) 108 (35.3%) 2 (0.7%) 125 (40.8%)
Total number of experiments is 306.
TABLE 2 | Number and percent of experiments (total number experiments
is 306) with statistical analyses of (1) RTs, (2) error data, (3) RTs and error
data, as well as (4) RTs and/or error data in Task 1.
RTs Errors RTs and
errors
RTs and/
or errors
Task 1 statistics 227 (74.2%) 166 (54.2%) 149 (48.7%) 234 (76.5%)
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TABLE 3 | Number and percent of experiments (total number experiments
is 149) with statistical analyses of RTs and error data (see Table 2) as well
as an effect of SOA on Task 1 performance (i.e., decreasing SOA and
increasing RTs/error rates).
RTs Errors RTs and
errors
RTs and/
or errors
Task 1 SOA effect 55 (36.9%) 73 (49.0%) 28 (18.8%) 100 (67.1%)
Discussion
Our review demonstrates that a lot of studies do not present all
data that is required to analyze and model dual-task processing
in the context of the central bottleneck theory in the case of
PRP dual-task experiments. First, while a reasonable amount of
studies presented RT data of both component tasks (69.3%), this
amount is drastically reduced for error data: only 40.8% of the
PRP studies presented this data type in tables and/or figures. This
rather low amount of studies including error data presentations
demonstrates that there is no obtainable conclusive interpretation
of PRPdual-task performance inmany studies. Thus, these studies
do not allow to completely model dual-task processing in the
context of the central bottleneck theory. Furthermore, we found
a rather low number of studies that analyzed this data statistically
and allowed conclusive conclusions about in this context. At this
point, it is however fair to admit that not all studies that were
identified based on our literature search on “PRP” pursued on
investigating the central bottleneck theory; the PRP paradigm can
be used manifold (e.g., to simply induce capacity constraints to
Task 2 processing). In such cases, reports, analyses, and interpreta-
tions should mainly focus on relevant aspects (e.g., primarily data
of Task 2).
If we included studies with statistical reports on error data and
RTs, a substantial number of experiments demonstrated that, with
decreasing SOA, there are increases of error rates, increases of
RTs, or both in Task 1. In fact, 67.1% of the included experiments
demonstrated one of these patterns. We assume that this number
could be even higher because (1) experiments with SOA null
effects in Task 1 may merely lack statistical power to reach the
significance threshold of a SOA main effect and/or (2) studies
with no impaired performance with decreasing SOA also include
studies showing an opposite pattern: performance impairments
with increasing SOA (see text Footnote 2). This pattern may,
however, demonstrate the impact of a response grouping strategy
(e.g., Borger, 1963; Schubert, 1996; Miller and Ulrich, 2008). This
strategy may mask a data pattern of an impaired performance
with decreasing SOA and thus may obscure the number of studies
including this pattern. Moreover, for reasons of comparability, we
exclusively focused on SOA main effects and neglected combina-
tions of these effects with alternative experimental factors (i.e.,
interactions). The extension of the focus to interactions could
potentially increase the number of experiments with performance
impairments of Task 1with decreasing SOA (particularlywhen the
SOA main effect is non-significant).
Nevertheless, there are a number of theories that explicitly con-
sider dual-task costs in Task 1 (in the PRP context: performance
impairments at short in contrast to long SOAs). First, capacity-
sharing theories assume that two response selections can be pro-
cessed in parallel, but that sharing the same limited resource(s)
causes dual-task costs (e.g., Herman and Kantowitz, 1970; Kan-
towitz and Knight, 1974, 1976; Kantowitz, 1978; Wickens, 2002;
Tombu and Jolicœur, 2003), because there are fewer resources
for each individual task and performance is thus impaired. Par-
ticipants strategically prioritized one task over another follow-
ing instructions and/or changes in the relationship of difficulty
between the combined tasks, which is consistent with this per-
spective (e.g., Norman and Bobrow, 1975; Navon and Gopher,
1979; Gopher et al., 1982). Recent representatives of capacity-
sharing theories (e.g., Logan andGordon, 2001; Navon andMiller,
2002; Tombu and Jolicœur, 2003) assume that sequential pro-
cessing, as anticipated in the central bottleneck theory, may be a
strategic product of flexible scheduling of limited resources. For
example, participants may not have followed the instruction of
PRP dual tasks strictly scheduling engagement 100% to Task 1
and 0% to Task 2 adequately. Task 1 effects can also be explained
by the assumption of a strategic task scheduling with a flexible
bottleneck localization during the task processing and resource
sharing at the level of executive control processes (Meyer and
Kieras, 1997).
Second, dual-task costs in Task 1were also explained in terms of
between-task crosstalk (e.g., Hommel, 1998; Logan and Schulkind,
2000; Logan and Gordon, 2001; Lien and Proctor, 2002; Navon
andMiller, 2002; Schubert et al., 2008). For instance, performance
decreases when two tasks require the simultaneous execution
of incompatible (e.g., left vs. right) in contrast to compatible
(e.g., left vs. left) spatial responses. This crosstalk assumption is
generally consistent with the assumption of capacity-sharing the-
ories, since both enable information transfer between component
tasks under dual-task conditions. Thus, if some of the studies
demonstrating Task 1 performance impairment with decreasing
SOA showed this impairment because of crosstalk, this find-
ing is consistent with sharing common resources between tasks.
The difference between crosstalk approaches and capacity-sharing
theories is however that the former depend on what content
of information is processed while dual-task costs depend on
what sort of operation is to be carried out is interpreted in the
latter capacity-sharing context. Interestingly, the approaches of
Hommel (1998), Lien and Proctor (2002), as well as Schubert
et al. (2008) propose a distinction of different sub-processes of
the response selection mechanisms (e.g., response activation and
initiation), which to different degrees are subjected to cross-task
and to sequential processing between tasks. This allows explaining
a range of the reported Task 1 effects, with elaborated bottleneck
models.
Third, the processing bottleneck (in form of a shared capacity
limitation or a structural bottleneck as in the central bottleneck
theory) requires the coordination of two task processing streams.
For instance, these task coordination processes are related to
the efficient preparation of Task 1 information (de Jong, 1995),
scheduling of response selections, as well as switches between
them (Umiltà et al., 1992; Schubert, 1996, 2008; Lien et al., 2003;
Band and van Nes, 2006; Sigman and Dehaene, 2006; Szameitat
et al., 2006; Liepelt et al., 2011; Strobach et al., 2012b, 2014).
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We assume that the latter set of mechanisms (i.e., task coor-
dination processes) particularly affects Task 1 processing under
conditions of uncertainty of task order processing (e.g., Arnell and
Duncan, 2002, Experiment 1; de Jong, 1995; Tombu and Jolicœur,
2002; Luria and Meiran, 2003, 2005, 2006; Sigman and Dehaene,
2006; Schubert, 2008; Leonhard and Ulrich, 2011; Strobach et al.,
2012a; Töllner et al., 2012) because the decision on the order of
bottleneck access is typically located before bottleneck processing
in Task 1 (Umiltà et al., 1992; Schubert, 1996; Hendrich et al.,
2012). The number of studies with task order uncertainty is,
however, rather low in comparison to the entire set of analyzed
PRP studies and thus should not obscure our general conclusion: a
substantial number of experiments in the context of PRPdual-task
experiments demonstrate decreasing Task 1 performance with
decreasing SOA, which is not consistent with the assumption
that processes of Task 1 are unaffected of Task 2 and bottleneck
processing in the context of PRP dual-task situations. Actually,
this calls for a more careful consideration of theories proposing
additions to the bottleneck assumption, which are sufficiently
general to explain Task 1 and Task 2 effects.
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